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Introduction
Governance is referred to today in almost fetishistic
terms, although the origins of what is regarded as
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a new notion are not always
recognised. In fact the term
comes from the France of the
Ancien Re´gime, where nego-
tiation and arbitration were
commonplace in the absence
of a strong state monopoly.
In the more distant etymo-
logical sense, the term sig-
nified a helm. In the con-
text of environmental chal-
lenges, governance is neces-
sary to orchestrate coopera-
tion between states (and their
bureaucracies), sometimes also including interna-
tional companies, learned societies and scientific
bodies – some of which are decision-makers –
NGOs and even ordinary citizens who may be
involved in short-term experiments of participa-
tive and deliberative democracy. Governance must
metaphorically sail the stormy seas of power rela-
tions and haggling between states during bitter
negotiations on particular issues, such as those
of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (1992) or the Nagoya Protocol on
Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) (2010). Often it
is short-term interests that prevail, no doubt linked
to internal constraints generated by the brevity
of political mandates, or even the bad faith of
some leaders who regard the consumption levels
of their electorate as non-negotiable. We have yet
to invent a way of harmonising and synchronising
the different timescales of environmental evolution,
industrial innovation and democratic processes.
However, a different,
equally crucial form of gov-
ernance is also required at a
more abstract level. Although
it is rarely theorised, the gov-
ernance of spheres of knowl-
edge is a necessary element
in any response to environ-
mental problems. Examples
of such spheres include eco-
nomics, politics, law, ethics,
environmental sciences and
all the domains of knowledge
relevant not only to an under-
standing of the state of the
environment, but also to the anticipation, justifi-
cation and implementation of long-term measures.
While it is important for analysis to temporarily
differentiate between these different spheres, they
are closely linked in spaces of negotiation. To
take an example, a speech by a head of state
(political sphere) at a climate summit will include
economic elements (such as the need for low cost
innovation or the implementation of a carbon tax
on transport), data from climatologists and sce-
narios from the International Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (scientific sphere), ethical justifica-
tions (such as responsibility for future generations)
and legal aspects (compensation paid to countries
where plants are exploited by foreign pharmaceu-
tical companies to develop patents). As elements
of these different spheres are present in periods of
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negotiation, and even more so in the implementation
of new measures and their evaluation, it is neces-
sary to understand the relationship between them.
Sometimes this must be made explicit, particularly
in the case of controversy, whether at the scientific
or normative level.
These ideas are relevant to practical experi-
ments involving experts, citizens and stakeholders.
Conducted with mini-publics, these experiments
promise a greater democratisation of the gover-
nance of environmental issues, while simultane-
ously providing rare opportunities to make manifest
the need to theorise relations between the fields
of knowledge involved. Below, I first consider
the place of the ethical sphere, then the tension
between innovation and responsibility, decisions
taken in situations of scientific uncertainty and the
structuring role of the precautionary principle in the
relationship between science, politics and ethics. I
shall end by considering the normative aspect of
this meta-principle, notably by acknowledging the
plurality of moral theories, and conclude with some
lessons for the experts.
My position is that while it is often the political
dimension that dominates, seeking only to foster
cooperation between free, equal individuals (or
states) but making no attempt to assess the effects
of their actions on the external world – on the
environment, for example – I do not support the
monopoly of any discipline. I prefer to envisage an
interdependency between the normative and factual
spheres pertinent to the problems to be settled. Of
course, the political sphere has advantages: it is
best equipped to accommodate the others; it is used
to holding together heterogeneous elements and
different or even opposing interests; and it requires
far less in the way of technical knowledge and skills.
However, given the importance of environmental
issues, the quality of the decisions to be taken means
that the political sphere should not stifle the others
when they are most pertinent to the discussion.
Global responsibility:
experiments in reflective
democracy
Clearly these questions are more than simply the-
oretical; they are key to the conflicting interpreta-
tions of environmental responsibility. Conflicts of
this kind require innovative forms of governance
to provide support and resolution. One source
of enhanced legitimacy, in relation to democracy,
negotiation and the management of environmental
controversy, is participation. It is sometimes said
that participation is should be more pluralist and
inclusive. It may involve consulting ordinary citi-
zens and indeed stakeholders. There are some inno-
vative interdisciplinary and pluralist governance
practices in which ordinary citizens and experts
form mini-publics (Goodin et al. 2009), usually
referred to in Europe by the term participatory
technology assessment (PTA). The structure of
the European Union (EU) encourages institutional
innovation. On the one hand, the EU often compares
different national solutions to the same problems,
thereby diversifying the market in ideas. On the
other, each state has to be able to convince the rest
when new European bodies are designed.
So the problem is what kind of public policy
should be devised in order to maintain the ethics
of The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of
Ethics for the Technological Age (Jonas [1979]
1991), which, despite his boldness, Jonas left to
one side, judging it too difficult. As a contribution
to the assessment of controversial technologies,
often described as new, such as Genetically Modi-
fied Organisms (GMOs) and certain medical tech-
nologies (pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, xeno-
transplantation), technology assessment agencies
have developed various kinds of new procedures
to involve citizens. These agencies have the task of
preparing political and economic decision-makers
to discuss complex scientific and technological
issues and informing the public (Reber 2006). How-
ever, it became clear that technology assessment
(TA) had its limitations in regard to public fears
and opposition, and also to issues of legitimacy,
norms, values and other aspects usually discussed
by the humanities and social sciences. For some
controversial technological and scientific choices, it
is not enough to rely solely on the advice of experts,
albeit of different opinions, provided only to politi-
cal and economic decision-makers. Similarly, the
resources used to popularise science among the
general public do not in themselves answer certain
criticisms. Mediation processes have also revealed
their limitations, being orientated towards the social
acceptability of, for example, new technologies
and major industrial developments. While it is
ultimately for political representatives to decide all
these questions, these representatives themselves
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have sometimes indicated that they would like to
see a wider range of actors involved in debates
around controversial technological subjects and
environmental controversies.
Experiments have therefore been conducted
on a small scale, often involving mini-publics, and
linking the two worlds of science and democracy
through PTA. Their different approaches (over 50
procedures) have opened up opportunities for stake-
holders to express their views, using a variety of
forms of communication (narration, interpretation,
argumentation, reconstruction) (Ferry 1991).
This new field of bold political experimenta-
tion, which I call “socio-political experimentation”,
is justified by a number of justifications. There is the
uncertainty among scientists, or at least the inability
of science to answer certain questions concerning
the risks that may be caused by controversial “new”
technologies (Jonas [1979] 1991). To this we can
add the differing opinions, sometimes entrenched in
opposing positions, both within and between disci-
plines, scientific communities and interest groups.
To put it another way, alongside the practical and
cognitive uncertainties (Hennen 1999) there is also
a normative uncertainty. These uncertainties are
subject to the constraints of the plurality (de jure
and de facto, or normative and factual) of practices
involved in scientific and ethical assessment, so
we are steering a course between precaution and
pluralism.
In basing this article on these procedures,
I hope to escape the confines of theory at the
intersection of science with moral and political
philosophy. I have not sought the philosophical
protection of Minerva’s owl, which takes flight only
at nightfall, long after the reality of experience has
faded. These PTA experiments make a crucial con-
tribution to building the long-awaited responsible
governance of the environment. Of course, although
these new modes of governance and collective
decision-making processes do work, they require
improvement (Reber 2011), so I do not wish to
overpraise them. They have their limitations, which
their newness renders more acceptable. Nor do I
naı¨vely forget the environmentalist social move-
ments. These have created an opposition to which
states (and sometimes private institutions) have
sought to respond by gradually devising different
experiments in PTA. Some of these movements,
such as Social Ecology (Bookchin 1990), have
developed useful discourse and practices. While
these participative processes are important and
popular as solutions to environmental problems, I
think we need to move towards more structured
forms of discussion, even inter-institutional gover-
nance, and away from mini-publics to international
political actors. I cannot settle all these problems
here, so I shall select a few more theoretical
questions, including the tension between innovation
and responsibility, decision-making in situations of
uncertainty between the sciences, and normative
decisions.
Here philosophy is a resource that is at once
descriptive, contributing to the development of a
moral sociology of assessment, and prescriptive
as an aid in developing future organisations and
institutions (on institutional design see Goodin
2003) that can provide the most effective tools for
the governance that concerns us here.
Ethics: a specific sphere
of knowledge for different
organisations
One of the spheres to be considered is ethics. We
speak of the ethics of biodiversity, for example, but
ethics is not just a type of issue, or an incitement, or
even an exhortation; it is a particular mode of justifi-
cation, a way of solving problems through due pro-
cess. It can do this on its own or, as we prefer, in col-
laboration with other forms of knowledge. I would
add that ethical considerations are present in the
background of some other spheres. For example, in
economics there are normative choices that provide
a framework before we proceed to calculations and
various forms of objectivisation. Few economists
do not bother with this justification, which is the
sub-domain of normative economics. For example,
how do we share the risks to which the inhabitants of
an Asian country are exposed and which are largely
due to the actions of consumers in North American
countries? What kinds of compensation might be
devised for less economically developed countries
which are now reaching pollution levels similar to
those produced by countries whose own growth
was achieved in polluted conditions? And how can
we deal with the fact that Chinese industry has a
large ecological footprint at a time when European
businesses are offshoring to China and Europe’s
massive importation of low-cost Chinese products
contributes to this degradation? These problems are
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considered and discussed before being subjected to
the constraints of purely economic thinking and
can be settled in very different ways, in the light of
different ethical justifications and schematisations.
The governance of spheres of knowledge
should make it possible to set sail on a sometimes
wild and unpredictable sea pulled in different direc-
tions by different spheres of knowledge. As we steer
our course, we shall be guided by the twin lights
of pluralism and the precautionary principle, two
concepts that can contain and structure the problem.
Their advantages are tangible existence in the case
of pluralism, which is increasingly commonly expe-
rienced, notably in the evaluation of ethical prob-
lems; and legal and political existence in the case
of the precautionary principle, which has enjoyed
sudden international recognition (for example in
the UN’s Rio Declaration on the Environment
and Development, 1992) and features prominently
among the pillars of the major European treaties, not
to mention the French Constitution, which adopted
it in 2005. I would add that pluralism is a key
concern of UNESCO, which has also proposed
some original ideas on the precautionary principle
(COMEST 1995). At the more philosophical level
that concerns us here, pluralism and precaution are
key to conflicts in the interpretation of environmen-
tal responsibility (Chardel et al. 2012).
Even if the (first level) issues of practical gov-
ernance – relations between states and institutions
– were settled, if political decision-makers had the
necessary courage and if states were agreed on the
fragility of the environment and convinced of the
actions to be taken, certain theoretical and practical
problems would still remain in relation to the (sec-
ond level) governance of the various types of rela-
tionship possible between the descriptive sciences
(natural sciences, medicine and engineering) and
their normative counterparts (moral philosophy,
politics, law, ethics and an element of economics).
In reality, the challenge of interdisciplinarity is
present at the level of both what is and what should
be or, to put it another way, the world of facts and
that of values (or any other normative element).
These two levels can be linked in different
ways. Some would argue for strict separation:
this tends to be true of positivist conceptions
comfortable with the division of labour – which
has moreover proved its worth in our complex
societies. Others admit a larger spectrum in the
name of realism, preferring close interaction or
forms of interdependency. I shall adopt this second
position here. The primary responsibility in relation
to environmental questions is a balanced realism,
which partial visions would truncate. I would add
that it is important to maintain a balance in the
governance of both the different spheres (politics,
ethics, economics, science) and the disciplines that
provide them with methods and results because
problems of interpretation affect spheres of knowl-
edge, their disciplines and also their sub-disciplines
(for example climatology and ecotoxicology)
A better world: innovation
with responsibility
While one element of environmental ethics is con-
servative and seeks to protect wildernesses, ecosys-
tems and species, it is important to acknowledge
human activities, and notably those described as
innovations. First, conservation poses a problem
for biologists who favour a more dynamic vision
of environmental systems. Second, the analyses
of conservative visions of nature leave out the
technological activities that human societies require
for their development. So we need to include both
innovation and responsibility, and indeed to talk
about responsible research and innovation (RRI),
to borrow a term from recent European research
policy (Von Schomberg 2011).
Every inch of the planet has now been discov-
ered, explored, mapped, attributed and documented
from the different perspectives of geography and
anthropology. Some parts have been the subject
of highly aesthetic films shot from helicopters
ruffling the treetops, such as the documentary Home
(Arthus-Bertrand 2009), which introduced us to
the most distant places on earth and became an
international phenomenon. So where are these new
worlds of ours? A few may find them in the stars
and the poetry of black holes and anti-matter, but
for all of us they lie in the future and in the
transformation of the planet – our world of today
– according to its “enframing” (Heidegger [1954]
1958) and ever more intricate colonisation by our
technologies. In a way these are giving birth to a new
world. Yet our course towards the world to come
is uncertain. Announcements by engineers and
industrialists of the coming of better microworlds
are relayed by political decision-makers seeking
promises of innovation; meanwhile other scientists,
voluntary groups and politicians do not want to see
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the coming of the promised better world, which they
regard as dangerous, preferring the world of today
or advocating another kind of world altogether.
So what of today’s forms of deliberation in
relation to the worlds to come, alternating between
best and worst? What moral security might be
sought in the relationship between knowledge and
skills, and how? While knowledge may require
courage, tenacity and creativity, doing something
and getting involved requires even more. This is
particularly true when it comes to doing the right
thing. Often, we lack practical knowledge. We know
how to do things but we know next to nothing
about their impact and the consequences of doing
them so controversial technologies, often described
as “new”, must now meet twin requirements. A
technological solution is proposed to solve a prob-
lem or to more successfully perform a task that
currently uses an older technique. This is the price
of innovation. For example, the scientists working
on GMOs present themselves as “improvers”. But
these “improvements” must meet requirements that
are both scientific and ethical in nature.
Posed in this way, the question cannot be
settled through the accepted form of a debate, with
facts produced by scientists on one side and, on
the other, ethics and indeed other disciplines such
as law, whose role is to deal with the values or
normative aspects of the proposed solutions. This
competition between improvements is key to discus-
sions about what the future will be. Many aspects
of the controversy are intertwined. First, there is
the comparison between the world of today and the
promised world to come. These two worlds form
the subject of competing and sometimes opposing
descriptions, predictions and scenarios. Second,
modes of problem-solving and improvement are
also a matter of controversy, relating to the negative,
unintended effects of improvements and to compar-
isons between them in order to select the best.
The new worlds opened up by the intrusion of
these technologies, their rejection or modification
(the “constructive technology assessment” – see Rip
et al. 1995), are the subject of controversies between
possible worlds (futuribles). Sometimes it is the
possibility of their realisation itself that is ques-
tioned. These controversies concern the following
three points at least:
(1) the choice (deterministic and certain) between
desired worlds and those to be avoided;
(2) the possibility that a particular predicted state
of the world (better or catastrophic) will occur
according to probabilities and predictions, fol-
lowing an event such as an accident (from the
catastrophist perspective);
(3) the hierarchisation or classification of worlds
to find the best order, making the largest num-
ber compatible with each other and ensuring
the least degree of irreversibility for the greatest
number of worlds, including our shared world
of today.
These three types of difficult problem are intercon-
nected and influence each other. The specialist field
of risk assessment deals mainly with the second
aspect and has trouble responding. Some new tech-
nologies mean that there is an urgent need for an
ethics of the future and a new political science that
can deal with these difficulties. The three types of
questions appear in snatches and heterogeneously
in the context of PTA.
How have we got to this point? What happened
between the New World of the Great Discoveries
in the sixteenth century and the innovations that
were supposed to lead to better worlds, which are
sometimes challenged both as technologies and in
terms of the worlds they herald? The status of
notions of progress, newness and innovation can
no longer go unquestioned. Innovation, which is
still often implicitly seen as a factor in the health
of the economy, job market and in well-being, and
even as a spur in some research fields, no longer
automatically commands support. For example,
some scientists, proud of new skills such as trans-
genesis, which makes it possible to produce GMOs,
find themselves in conflict with groups of crop
saboteurs, who claim to act on the basis of ethics
and values of good citizenship and destroy their
field trials, even though these are guarded by the
police. In so doing, the saboteurs stop experiments
conducted to better understand GM phenomena in
situ. These problems also have repercussions on
the quarrel over the legitimacy of territories over
these types of issues. Orders made by local author-
ities, ostensibly in the name of the precautionary
principle, prohibiting these trials as long as they
have not been scientifically proven to be harmless,
are rendered nul and void by the French courts. At
the same time, all the Swiss cantons have banned
the use of animal and plant GMOs in response to
public pressure (Reber 2011). The technological
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improvements and advances on which innovations
are based are now regarded with suspicion: innova-
tion is on trial and arouses passionate resistance; the
“better” that is proclaimed may conceal something
worse. To borrow the words of Hans Jonas, one of
the very few philosophers to have made an impres-
sion with his The Imperative of Responsibility. In
Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age,
technological “meliorism” could be dangerous. As
Jonas ([1979] 1991, p.101) writes, “The promise of
modern technology has become a menace, that is,
that technology is intrinsically menacing”.
This technological civilisation has become a
virgin territory for ethics, or rather a territory to
be explored in order to go beyond an ethics of
relations between people sharing the same space-
time, unmediated by technologies. Our discus-
sions must also take account of intertwined socio-
technological relations over long timescales, in
what Jonas referred to as a “creeping apocalypse”
(Jonas [1988] 1992, p.101).
The issue of the consequences of technological
innovations for society and for the environment
is not new. Jonas expressed concerns about the
overturning of the order of theory and practice over
50 years ago. We know how to do things that have
implications of which we are largely ignorant. This
turn of affairs radicalises philosophical undertak-
ings that had already indicated the difficulty of
making assessments on too large a scale, in relation
to excessively long chains of cause and effect and
probabilities that are difficult, if not impossible, to
determine. I think of Hume ([1740] 1983, Book
III, pp.141–267). The same is true of Mill’s chains
of argument – used as an epigraph by Boudon
(1995); Mill states, “On every subject on which
difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends
on a balance to be struck between two sets of
conflicting reasons.” Even Kant, the philosopher
of limits, still seems too optimistic with his three
famous questions: “What can I hope for?”, “What
ought I to do?” and “What can I know?” He would
find it hard to deal with the question of GMOs.
So should we settle for a minimal ethics,
which Jonas would have described as “woolly”?
Should we simply look to the legal sphere and
“biodegradable” laws that can remain in step with
technological developments and not hinder new
possibilities? Is technology the fate of politics,
as Jonas thinks? Should politics move forward as
directed by lobby groups in favour or against this
or that technology? Can we devise a form of civic
or civilised public debate?
We do not have to give in to fear, or to the
heuristics of fear, and can seek to nuance Jonas’s
dramatic, apocalyptic tone. However, his remarks
on the insufficiencies of traditional ethics and what
he calls “woolly” ethics are well founded in relation
to the threats he perceives. The philosophies of
Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger and Le´vinas are also
astutely criticized in Peter Kemp’s (1991) more
recent book on the ethics of technology, Det uer-
stattelige. En teknologi-etik. These ethics apply to
intersubjective relations between contemporaries,
often really present to each other, in small actions on
a small scale and with limited effects, unmediated
by technological devices. I would add that they
do not recognise socio-technological relations and
their variations. Furthermore, today’s technologies
are different (Saint-Sernin 2007); they are the fruit
of teamwork and have even more ramifications
when scientific discoveries give rise to innovations.
In his history of the relationship between technol-
ogy, power, knowledge and responsibility, Gilbert
Simondon, the original thinker on technologies
(Reber 2008), is more optimistic than Jonas. He sees
molecular biology as a revolution in the primary
sense of the word. It is a danger because it can
manipulate not just nature, but also people. His
discussion of the thesis advanced by Jonas in The
Imperative of Responsibility highlights problems
that remain pertinent, such as the need for an ethics
of technology orientated towards the future and thus
able to take account of things that have not yet
happened, when technology is subject to conflicting
judgments – better for some, apocalyptic for others.
However, he makes our task more difficult because
he claims that scientists regard all futurology as
impossible. So can we do nothing but simply give
way to an enlightened catastrophism, as suggested
far more recently by Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2001), in
his critique of the precautionary principle partly
inspired by Jonas? I think not.
In practice, critiques of the precautionary
principle have often been based on caricature. So
I propose to use its most complete formulations,
validated by legitimate bodies at the end of long
negotiations. One example is the document of 2
February 2000 produced by the European Com-
mission, Communication from the Commission on
the Precautionary Principle (COM 2000). This can
provide a basis to pursue Jonas’s thinking, even if
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he does not use the term precautionary principle but
speaks instead of a principle of responsibility. The
precautionary principle notably makes it possible to
consider the political aspect, which Jonas regarded
as too difficult to take on. Some have seen Jonas
as an anti-democrat. Marie-He´le`ne Parizeau (1996,
p.539) writes: “At the political level, his choices are
on the side of a government of the wise rather than
democracy.”
So at best, Jonas would turn to wise men,
whom he saw as the only ones capable of taking
the necessary decisions, unlike politicians who are
subject to the rules of democracy and have a “short
life-expectancy” corresponding to their mandates.
We could add that voter choices are often made for
short-term reasons.
So we shall see how the precautionary princi-
ple can bring both scientific and normative assess-
ment to bear on controversial questions relating
to such things as technology and climate change;
and try to see how it can make interdisciplinary
governance possible.
The precautionary principle
as a mode of governance in
situations of scientific
uncertainty
I intend here to propose the precautionary
principle as an appropriate framework in which
to conduct a PTA and to produce high quality
results. This principle more or less exhaustively
includes and combines assessments of a scientific,
ethical and political nature. It has become a
meta-norm, intended to provide a framework for
certain political decisions regarding scientific
and technological choices when there is great
scientific uncertainty and too little knowledge of
the phenomena to establish probable outcomes.
This principle means that scientific uncertainty
does not have to paralyse action. It should normally
be applied in specific circumstances, notably
where there is high uncertainty due to the limits of
scientific knowledge in assessing risks that could
cause serious or irreversible damage.
While this principle has rapidly become a
key factor in managing certain public scientific
controversies, it remains subject to disputes over
interpretation. Its importance, its newness and this
instability have led to the need for clarifications. A
former French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, com-
missioned a report on its interpretation (Kourilsky
and Viney 2000). The principle became particularly
well known due to its insertion in principle 15 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration, which stipulates that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
A few months earlier, in February 1992, the Euro-
pean Maastricht Treaty had introduced the pre-
cautionary principle as one of the main principles
underpinning European Union policy in the envi-
ronmental domain.
It is unusual for a principle to come to
international prominence so quickly, shaking up
the different spheres of politics, science and even
ethics. However, it has had some detractors. In the
1990s it generated disputes between Europe and
the United States at the World Trade Organization.
The Americans even suspected the Europeans of
obscurantism. In France too, intellectuals and polit-
ical advisers such as Jacques Attali (2007) called it
“out-dated and hot air”.
Within the domain of philosophy, well-
respected thinkers have adopted sometimes dia-
metrically opposed positions in its regard – I am
thinking, for example, of the disagreement played
out in the books by Cass R. Sunstein (2005)
and Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2001). Sunstein adopts a
non-catastrophist approach, while Dupuy takes the
opposite view, observing that we should act as
though catastrophe were a certainty. It is a shame
that the European texts are not cited in these dis-
putes. By way of illustration, let us take the oft-cited
and stimulating essay by Stephen Gardiner of the
University of Washington in “A Core Precautionary
Principle”. Gardiner begins with the statement:
“[T]he Precautionary Principle still has neither a
commonly accepted definition nor a set of criteria
to guide its implementation . . . no one is quite
sure . . . how it might be implemented” (Gardiner
2006, p.33). Unsurprisingly, his bibliography is
deafeningly silent on the implementation of the
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principle in the aforementioned European COM
2000. However, Gardiner’s strategy is unusual,
since he proposes a Rawlsian version of the precau-
tionary principle that exploits its maximin (max-
imisation of the course of action that produces the
fewest undesirable effects).
One final interpretative difficulty is due to the
fact that contained within this principle are several
others, so emphasis is often placed on one aspect of
what must be described as a meta-principle. Some
authors focus on the nature of the risks, others on
a comparison of the hypotheses concerning those
risks, others on whether the most catastrophic sce-
narios should be taken seriously, others on looking
at alternative solutions to (new) developments that
might cause serious and/or irreversible damage and
others still on the measures to be taken, these being
only a few of the possibilities. Within these choices
themselves, we can see possible nuances; this is
true of the choice of levels of precaution in the
measures to be taken, where some very sensibly
speak of a continuum in which the different pos-
sible decisions corresponding to different levels of
precaution can be located (Myers and Raffensperger
2006).
The originality of the precautionary prin-
ciple in relation to prevention is that the facts
are not established with certainty, but there is a
strong presumption that serious and/or irreversible
damage will be caused. This then removes the
need to delay action until comprehensive scientific
evidence has been provided or, more precisely,
makes it possible to carry out complementary
research and ask the question of whether or not to
act. Looking more closely at how scientific facts
are established, we find different types of well-
documented uncertainty in the European Commis-
sion’s COM 2000 cited above. The recognition
of these uncertainties and their more or less opti-
mistic or pessimistic management lead back to the
hypotheses concerning the phenomena in question.
However, this communication proves very unbal-
anced when we compare its highly detailed scien-
tific element with its normative aspect, grounded
only in the need for a high level of protection
for societies and the environment (through the
European treaties such as Maastricht), and social
acceptability. So let us look at the various solu-
tions proposed for decision-making in situations of
uncertainty.
Political decisions in
situations of scientific
uncertainty
We can identify several possible paths for decision-
making in situations of scientific uncertainty, when
there are risks of causing serious and/or irreversible
damage. To return to the dispute between worlds
mentioned above, if we are to compare worlds
modified by technologies, we must also be able
to predict the effects of those technologies. These
effects can be seen as causes of damage or can
simply be regarded as very likely to cause damage.
“This raises the question of how we can arm
assessments for these decisions when it is not
possible to attribute probability to predictions due
to insufficient and imprecise data, or to the com-
plexity of relations through which the phenomena
in question can be understood”, to borrow the words
of Morgan and Henrion (1998). Based on the state
of the art, I propose the following typology of
political decision-making in situations of scientific
uncertainty. Decisions may be taken:
1. using a criterion of utility, which bases deci-
sions on the values of their inferred effects.
These can be calculated using a cost-benefits
or risks/benefits analysis. These calculations
can themselves be made using five different
approaches:
– 1.1 using a determinist approach;
– 1.2 using a probabilistic approach, notably
when uncertainty is integrated into the
assessment;
– 1.3 according to a criterion of efficiency,
based on economic (or other) consider-
ations, in an attempt to find solutions
that can meet the objectives at the lowest
possible cost;
– 1.4 according to a criterion of cost limitation,
seeking to maximise the reduction of
risk in the light of budgetary constraints.
Here we can speak of the theory of the
maximisation of multi-attribute utility,
which seeks to specify the utility function
in order to assess results according to
all major attributes, including risks and
uncertainties;
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– 1.5 seeking to minimise the possibility of the
worst possible results and to maximise the
possibility of the best possible results.
2. According to criteria based on law, to which we
can add certain principles, which are not pri-
marily concerned with results but with decision-
making processes. Here again the conceptions
fall into four main types:
– 2.1 zero risk, independent of benefits and
costs, which thus strictly excludes taking
the risk in question;
– 2.2 limited or contained risk, taking a specific
level as harmful or an imprudent exposure
to danger;
– 2.3 approved compensation, enabling (con-
sent to) risks by people who voluntarily
give their consent and receive compensa-
tion for any disruption or losses incurred;
– 2.4 an approved process guaranteeing that all
parties involved follow an identified set
of procedures.
3. Technological criteria of the same order as the
criterion for cost/efficiency assessment, but in
order to select the best available technology for
regulating and reducing environmental risks.
4. Hybrid criteria containing criteria of types 1 and
2.
I shall end with a few remarks about this
typology. First, the calculation of the utilities of the
different choices may be determinist, probabilistic
or impossible. In the latter case we can turn to
procedures and rights. While these approaches to
taking political decisions in situations of scientific
uncertainty are in common use, the precautionary
principle proposes to treat the third case without
necessarily relying on rights. However, it does
oblige respect for a transparent procedure that
guarantees a good scientific assessment. Second,
criterion 1.5, consisting of minimising the possi-
bility of the worst possible results and maximising
those for the best possible results, is a forerunner of
the precautionary principle. Third, I would note that
there are different combinations according to the
choice of calculation, compensation or procedure.
Fourth, these decision-making models combine dif-
ferent types of considerations and fields, including
economics, law, risk assessment and technologies.
In addition to those just mentioned, each discipline
may gain ascendancy over the others more easily
according to the criteria chosen. For example, type
2 gives the primary role to the law and types 1, 3
and 4 to the natural sciences and engineering. The
same can be said of the precautionary principle.
From one disciplinary perspective to the next, there
may be a focus on the different aspects presented in
the preceding section. For example, if the emphasis
is placed on scientific uncertainties, the natural
sciences and engineering will dominate; if it is on
the proportionate measures to be taken, economics
and law will be primary. I think, on the contrary,
that arbitrary asymmetries should be avoided and
all relevant disciplines should be included.
Ethical pluralism for a
balanced precautionary
principle
Having clarified the various types of relations
between scientific uncertainty and political deci-
sions, I now propose to further develop the norma-
tive element implied in the precautionary principle.
While the European Commission’s Communication
recognises that decision-makers face the dilemma
of whether to act or not (COM 2000), posing this
very “Hamletian” question does nothing to solve
the problem. From the point of view of soliciting
disciplines, the precautionary principle as proposed
is marked by the strong, highly developed presence
of the natural sciences and engineering. Where the
humanities and social sciences are concerned, to a
lesser degree we must settle for the vague notion of
the social acceptability of risk, and of the high level
of security to be ensured. At this level, the decision-
makers are very much alone. Could we not start by
“arming” the political aspect of assessment, taking
care to develop the ethical aspect?
Given the variety of elements in moral and eth-
ical life related to the pluralism of ethical theories, it
is no surprise that in relation to a principle that must
deal with so many uncertainties, different options
can present themselves to the thinker or decision-
maker. So alongside the problem of the interpre-
tation of environmental responsibility in general
and the precautionary principle in particular, we
find that of the management of plurality. This is
because our societies are increasingly characterised
by plurality, not only for cultural reasons, but also
because of the great specialisation of knowledge.
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As I have shown in La de´mocratie ge´ne´tiquement
modifie´e (Reber 2011), this plurality directly affects
quality criteria in the secondary assessment of PTA
experiments, and more broadly of public debates
and those between experts concerning environmen-
tal assessment. These criteriologies (Reber 2005)
vaguely mention the term “pluralism”. Often it
is rendered equivalent to “plurality” rather than
the normative term “pluralism”, which proposes a
particular management of plurality (Reber 2005).
Plurality is a matter of facts, whereas pluralism
is normative and indicates a type of approach,
which can be contrasted with relativism on the
one hand and monism on the other. Relativism
refuses to discuss normative dimensions in them-
selves, explaining differences in terms of affiliations
(religious, cultural, ideological, historical) sources
of cognitive bias. Monism requires a single value
(or value system) to dominate. While excessive
plurality or radical pluralism can threaten social
stability, at different levels both are also guarantees
of a democratic society. With the current criteria
for the quality of debates in PTA, the question of
ethics remains as yet underdeveloped. On the one
hand, values are not enough to settle moral and
ethical questions, either in debates, or in relation
to ethical theory and meta-ethics. Furthermore,
moral values are hard to grasp. They are subject to
distinctions, fragmentation and refinement (Scheler
[1916] 1955), not to mention the difficult question
of the relationship between actions and values, for
example, and whether or not values can motivate
action. On the other hand, in a justificatory context
such as PTA, it is hard to see how we can do without
turning for support to the great wealth of ethical the-
ories, and thus to the pluralism of ethical theories.
While they do not always ultimately enable us to
make decisions, and while they can be secondary
in relation to the moral insights of citizens and
experts, they have the great advantage of making it
possible to objectivise and justify judgements and
to render them more convincing. I do not think that
it is always possible to come to a final decision, but
nor do I think that we should settle for relativism in
this regard. We need to be able to couple an ethical
pluralism of values and theories with cognitive and
epistemic pluralism
Moral philosophy is a field of knowledge that
can inform tensions of this kind, always on condi-
tion that it works with competing ethical theories,
permitting a broader ethical pluralism than that of
values alone (Reber 2006), and more generally with
the question of the difficulty of judgment.
On this particular point, the typology based on
Morgan and Henrion is interesting from the point of
view of ethical theories for we can easily recognise
forms of consequentialism in the case of models
based on utility (1), and forms of deontologism
in models based on rights (2), to which I added
principles. So ethical theories help to structure
decision-making in situations of uncertainty. True,
they are more abstract and disciplines other than
moral philosophy take a more practical approach to
these problems.
From the point of view of ethical theories,
the precautionary principle is fundamentally con-
sequentialist. For example, it stipulates that an
assessment of the possible consequences of a lack
of action must be considered. However, because
of the competition from other ethical theories, I
see a limit to this arbitrary choice of a single
ethical theory. This can already be seen in terms
of common practices of decision-making in situ-
ations of uncertainty, which may choose criteria
of utility or procedural criteria based on rights
or principles. Let us take the very controversial
case of asbestos (Reber and Sato 2009) in the
distant period when scientific data had not yet
reached preventative levels. In practice, the gulf
between the different scientific hypotheses made
it impossible for decision-makers and experts to
establish effective, reliable probabilities that could
inform risk-benefit assessments. It was even harder
to deduce consequences, including those for the
distant future and in the social domain. One might
have thought that the solution established by the
legal route (deontologism) could have avoided
many deaths and what was called one of the greatest
health scandals of the contemporary world. Con-
versely, in other situations risk-benefit assessments
are better suited to responding than deontological
approaches.
All ethical theories should be considered in
decision-making. We are in a circle of continuity
with scientific data on the one hand and ethical
assessments on the other. These assessments ques-
tion the options suggested by the data from several
points of view, such as their consequences and
more universal principles. I would add that ethical
assessment takes account of a range of entities,
including states of the world, people, procedures
and technologies.
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On both the scientific and normative sides,
there is an issue of different degrees of plausi-
bility. The high level of protection sought for the
inhabitants of the European Union, with recourse
to the precautionary principle, should not become
a single, monist value crushing the delicate process
of deliberation. On this point, the EU judge uses
the precautionary principle as a guide in creating a
balance between considerations of different orders
relating to the health of individuals, the economic
effects, protection against environmental conse-
quences and free enterprise and the free circulation
of goods. We must maintain a balance between the
principles that constitute this meta-principle, which
also includes the principle of proportionality. I
think, therefore, that we should not simply weigh up
all these principles and considerations, but approach
them in a balanced fashion.
Conclusion: the environment
needs experts in pluralism
and dissonance
The most frequent hypothesis adopted in designing
PTA is that of the mutual complementarity of fields
of knowledge so the approach is often implicitly
syncretist, based on the view that it is possible
explore all facets of the problem. This kind of
syncretism is not pluralism. True, attempts are made
to call in all the experts who can shed light on
the different aspects of the problem. However, if
everything was so good in the best of all possible
worlds, it would not have been necessary to call in
experts and citizens to assess a technology or an
environmental problem. This is not simply a prob-
lem of the fragmented nature of knowledge, but of
controversy. The controversy is first of all internal to
disciplines (intra-disciplinary pluralism), with their
unresolved disagreements and positions adopted in
relation to uncertainties, enabling citizens to assess
answers given in cases of conflict.
Epistemic interdisciplinary pluralism (inter-
disciplinary pluralism) can be weak if there is a jux-
taposition of separate disciplines, and strong where
the boundaries between disciplines are porous and
translation occurs between them. Depending on the
questions posed, we may have cooperation between
disciplines but also in some cases tensions and
indeed conflicts.
The precautionary principle not only has the
advantage of presiding over the balance to be main-
tained between several dimensions or values, it also
structures and makes operational a fundamental
difference between the approach of experts and that
of academic researchers. The role of experts is to
enlighten decision-makers and they must examine
the facts in the light of all available explanations,
including those that are minority views, while
researchers choose to explore the most convincing
path both in terms of hypotheses and at each stage
of research. This is also true in relation to normative
options. Often, sadly, there are more academics than
experts in the sense given above, and indeed experts
who express their opinions outside their field of
expertise. A proposition not yet explored would
be to have experts in the field who are actively
involved in debates and question the various aca-
demic researchers invited, making them justify their
positions and the solidity of their disagreements.
The precautionary principle would make it
possible to guarantee these two forms of plural-
ism, the epistemic (intra- and interdisciplinary)
and the normative, within PTA and later in
inter-institutional and international relations. With
the distinction between experts and academic
researchers, where interdisciplinary epistemic plu-
ralism is concerned, we encounter problems of the
arbitration of disputes between faculties or disci-
plines. Given the small number of people capable
of managing such a broad pluralism, it can be more
certainly ensured by means of procedural require-
ments since, depending on the questions asked,
there are sometimes tensions between disciplines.
Whatever the disciplines and their boundaries
or the crossing of boundaries between them, the
world is beyond the bounds of knowledge. It
cannot be reduced to its epistemology and the
knowledge we have of it, even in cases of disso-
nance. Moreover, the term cognitive dissonance,
borrowed from music, seems not to take account of
contemporary music, which plays on dissonance.
Rather than always seeking agreement (or delib-
erative disagreement) or consensus, in PTA it is
sometimes possible to imagine an acceptance of
dissonance (Rescher 1993). Here there is an analogy
between the supporters of a static, conservationist
approach to the environment and those on the site
of dynamism and meta-stability. We could come
to terms with limited differences in political life
and in the encounter between different spheres
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of knowledge, with a pluralist recognition of the
different positions, when choices are sensible and
not unimportant (relativist). Open minds are not
empty. A recognition of ethical and epistemic plu-
ralism enables citizens and experts from different
epistemic communities to put their theories to the
test, sometimes to reach consensus, but also to
revise their positions or beliefs. On this point, I
propose aiming for a pluralism that resists pressures
to reach a consensus at any price, which in practice
requires citizens to produce a joint final report in
too short a time. This pluralism could be based
on four criteria: recognition of legitimate diversity,
limited dissonance, an acceptance of difference and
respect for the autonomy of others and/or their
disciplines. This might make it possible to cope
with disagreement in cases where consensus is
not possible. This pluralist, non-relativist position
would have the advantage of revealing the different
reasonable positions on a particular point of sci-
entific controversy, without settling for a mean, a
lower common denominator or, worse still, a vote.
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